主题：Promotions and the
best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms
promote the best potential manager or the best worker in their current job?
Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 214 firms, we find
evidence consistent with the Peter Principle: when making promotion decisions, firms
prioritize current job performance at the expense of other observable
characteristics that better predict managerial performance. We estimate that
the costs of managerial mismatch are substantial, suggesting that firms make
inefficient promotion decisions or that the incentive benefits of emphasizing
current performance is also high.
Kelly Shue teaches Corporation Finance (35200) in the MBA program and Behavioral Finance (35906) in the PhD program. She earned a PhD and MA in Economics and an AB in Applied Mathematics (summa cum laude) from Harvard University. Prior to her doctoral studies, she worked as an analyst at Weiss Asset Management.
Shue’s academic interests lie at the intersection between behavioral economics and empirical corporate finance. Her research has explored executive social networks, incentives and executive compensation, the gambler’s fallacy, M&A, corporate social responsibility, loan screening, and errors in voting. Her research has been awarded the AQR Insight Award, the Wharton School-WRDS Award for Best Empirical Finance Paper, and the UBS Global Asset Management Award for Research in Investments. Her current research examines persuasive news distortion by firms, contrast effects in market reactions to earnings announcements, and the Peter Principle in promotion tournaments.